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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,

Plaintiff and A.ppellant,

vs.
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION
and J. DEAN GERSTNER,

Case No.
12118

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a consolidation of three lawsuits involving the rights and obligations of Vulcan Steel Corporation
and its two shareholders, J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian, and the interpretation of an agreement between
them dated April 12, 1965.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case has been before this Court before. Upon
entry of this Court's decision affirming the lower court's
partial summary judgment granting Markosian the right
to require redemption of his Vulcan stock (23 Utah 2d
287, 462 P. 2d 166), Gerstner amended his pleading and
in turn moved for partial summary judgment and the lower
court granted the motion and entered an order for liquidation and dissolution of Vulcan "in lieu of redemption of
shares by Markosian".
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
of Partial Summary Judgment ordering liquidation and
dissolution of Vulcan in lieu of redemption of shares by
Markosian.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The specific background facts underlying this litigation have already been presented to this Court, and need
not be reviewed in detail again. Suffice it to say that
Gerstner and Markosian formed a corporation, Vulcan
Steel Corporation, to engage in the steel fabrication business, and they were the sole shareholders, Gerstner owning
51 % and Markosian 49% of the stock. As is often the case
in closely held corporations, Gerstner and Markosian entered into an agreement subsequently adopted and ratified
by the corporation, which attempted to set forth procedures
for disposition of their stock under certain circumstances.
(The agreement, dated April 12, 1965, is set forth in its
entirety in the appendix to this brief, and hereinafter is
sometimes referred to as the "Agreement".)
In January of 1968, Markosian terminated his employment with Vulcan and invoking his rights under subparagraph 3 (e) of the Agreement demanded that his stock be
repurchased.
Vulcan and Gerstner refused to comply with this demand, arguing that the contractual provision did not apply
in the case of voluntary termination of employment. Mar·
kosian, therefore, on April 29, 1968 filed his complaint seek·

ing specific performance of the redemption agreement. The
lower court agreed with his position and this Court on December 15, 1969 affirmed the lower court and held that the
contract required a repurchase of the stock of Markosian.
(23 Utah 2d 287, 462 P. 2d 166.)

The highest court of the state having spoken, Markosian might reasonably have been expected to assume that
his contractual rights had now been finally determined,
but such was not to be the case. On January 12, 1970 he
received a certified letter from Vulcan's and Gerstner's
counsel, (R. p. 299, Exhibit "B"), referring to Markosian's
demand for repurchase given two years before. For the
first time notice was given that Gerstner was invoking an
additional provision of the agreement, paragraph 3 (e).
Such paragraph provided:
(e) Dual Notice. In the event both Markosian
and Gerstner wish to terminate their employment
by Corporation, and desire to have Corporation purchase their stock, the parties hereto agree to vote
their stock for the liquidation and dissolution of
Corporation.
On February 27, 1970, Gerstner and Vulcan moved to
amend their pleadings (R. p. 296) and for the first time
the pleadings of the lawsuit raised the issue of paragraph
3 (e) Dual Notice. No allegation was made in the amended
pleading that Gerstner had terminated his employment with
Vulcan or even intended to terminate employment, but
Gerstner sought to utilize paragraph 3 ( e) to require dissolution and liquidation of the corporation "in lieu of the

4
repurchase of Markosian's stock by the corporation" (R.
p. 298).

Thereupon, on March 26, 1970, Vulcan and Gerstner
moved for partial summary judgment for liquidation and
dissolution of the corporation in lieu of redemption of Markosian's shares.
On April 29, 1970, after argument, the lower court
granted Vulcan and Gerstner's motion and "in lieu of redemption of shares by Markosian under subparagraph 3(e)
of said agreement" appointed a receiver to proceed with
liquidation and dissolution of the corporation (R. p. 333334, 337-340). At all times up to the date of the lower
court's order, Gerstner remainer an officer employed by
Vulcan.
Markosian moved for a rehearing on the motion which
was denied, (R. p. 336) and Markosian petitioned this
Court for interlocutory appeal which this Court granted
on July 15, 1970.
ARGUMENT
THE ORDER OF APRIL 29, 1970 DISREGARDS THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME
COURT.

I.

The order of February 24, 1969, affirmed by this
Court, provided that the April 12, 1965 agreement
"imposes a duty upon [Vulcan] to redeem Abraham
Markosian's stock, and that said corporation is now
obligated to redeem such stock at a price to be determined in accordance with said agreement" (R. P·
177).
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Surely Markosian could reasonably assume that at
least this issue, amongst many other complex ones involved
in this litigation, had been resolved. He was entitled to have
his stock purchased pursuant to the formula carefully
worked out in the agreement.
Yet over a year after the entry of the original order
of the District Court, he is told that "in lieu of" his redemption rights he must await the dissolution and liquidation
of the corporation and receive whatever share of the proceeds, if any, that might be realized. Thus, the order of
April 29, 1970 provides :
"for liquidation and dissolution of [Vulcan] pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) Dual Notice, of the
Agreement of April 12, 1965, in lieu of redemption
of shares by Markosian" ... (R. p. 334).
The order of Judge Hall might just as well have concluded "in lieu of the redemption ordered by the Supreme
Court". The effect is identical. There had been no qualification of or condition attached to this right to redemption
in either this Court's opinion or of the lower court.
After two years of vigorously defended litigation, after
the right which Markosian had asserted was affirmed by
the highest tribunal of this state, this right in total disregard of this Court's mandate was taken away from him.
The loaf he had fought for and which this Court said he
deserved has become a stone.

II. THE ORDER OF APRIL 29, 1970 INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT.
What has changed since this court's decision of December 15, 1969? Only one material event has occurred.
Gerstner in June, 1970, two years after he and Vulcan
breached their obligation to redeem, gave notice that he had
"elected" to invoke the liquidation provision, and only then
for the first time did he seek to insert this issue in the
pleadings.
Up to the time of this Court's decision Gerstner had
deliberately refrained from electing liquidation. To be sure,
he made threats that he might elect, and such suggestions
crept into his brief filed in this Court. But such threats
were only that. They were always expressly conditioned
upon the court ruling as it did (e.g. "If the present interpretation of the agreement is sustained ... Gerstner hereby
serves notice that he may be required to invoke the provisions of subparagraph 3 ( e) requiring a liquidation and
dissolution of the Corporation ... " Gerstner and Vulcan
Appellant's Brief, p. 13. In Gerstner's Petition for Intermediate Appeal on the earlier order, he stated, "If this
Court affirms the Order of the Third Judicial District
Court granting defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, then plaintiff, Vulcan Steel Corporation, and
defendant, J. Dean Gerstner, will determine whether to in·
voke the provisions of dual notice contained in the agreement . . . " (R. p. 168). In the memorandum supporting
the petition, it was stated, "If the present construction of
the agreement is sustained . . . Gerstner hereby serves
notice that he may be required to invoke the provisions of
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paragraph 3(c) [sic] requiring a liquidation and dissolution ... " (R. p. 22). Emphasis added.
This cautious wording was not an election. Surely
Gerstner could not have been held to it, because he had
carefully qualified what he would do with the words, "if",
"may'', and "will determine whether". Far from making
any definite commitment, he was trying carefully to leave
himself completely free to maneuver. In other words this
is a classic case of someone trying to have his cake and eat
it too.
Even this long delayed alleged "election" of Gerstner
does not purport to comply with the express terms of the
provision which he seeks to invoke. Gerstner did not make
the allegation that he wished to terminate his employment,
a condition expressly contained in the Dual Notice provision. Nor could he, as he was at all times up to the date
date of the lower court's order an officer employed by
Vulcan.
As this court has held in this case, any particular provision in this agreement must be interpreted in the context of the whole agreement, Vulcan Steel Corporation v.
Markosian, 23 Utah 2d 287, 462 P. 2d 166; see also Corn...
wall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369
P. 2d 928 (1962); Seal v. Tayco, 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d
503 ( 1965).
Taken in the context of the entire agreement, the dual
notice provision of paragraph 3(e) referring to liquidation
and dissolution can only have meant to apply to contemporaneous or simultaneous elections of both parties to termin-
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ate, or the situation where one party demanded redemption
and the other within a reasonable time thereafter elects to
proceed by liquidation rather than redemption.
It cannot have been intended to permit the shareholder

who remains and elects to continue his employment with
Vulcan (as did Gerstner for more than two years) to await
events, refuse to honor his contractual duty to redeem, and
then, after he was finally forced by a court of law to redeem, to attempt to avoid that duty by seeking a liquidation.
The requirement of a prompt exercise of any rights
under paragraph 3 ( e) is implicit from the terms of the
agreement. Thus, the agreement provides that in the event
one of the parties makes demand for redemption, the pur·
chase price shall be paid to him pursuant to the following
schedule:
"in three equal installments . . . with the first in·
stallment payable within 15 days after the determin·
ation of the price and the other two installments to
be made yearly on the same date in each succeeding
year . . . Said purchase price shall be determined
not more than 45 days after the written offer ... "
Agreement, Paragraph 3 ( c).
Thus, under the instant facts, the first installment was
due to Markosian no later than March 23, 1968, the second
by March 23, 1969, and the third by March 23, 1970. There·
fore, the first two-thirds ( %) of the price was already due
and payable well before Gerstner made his "election" to
liquidate. Whatever a reasonable time within which paragraph 3 ( e) could be utilized, surely it could not be a per·

iod any longer than the time when payment was required
to be made under the redemption provision.
Moreover, to allaw Gerstner to make such an election
under paragraph 3 ( e) two years after a demand for redemption would work not only a serious inequity upon
Markosian, but would as a practical matter invalidate and
annul his rights under the redemption clause.
The ruinous practical consequences are readily apparent. At the time Markosian made his demand for redemption he was, because of his personal involvement as an employee, knowledgeable as to the financial condition of the
Corporation, and well able to compute the value of his holding. Such value was the result of the joint efforts of the
two shareholders. If Gerstner had, upon receipt of Markosian's demand, exercised his right to require dissolution
under paragraph 3(e) within, say, 15 days thereafter, at
least the basis of valuation would have been essentially the
same.
But now Gerstner seeks to enforce a valuation at a
time when he has had sole control of the operation and
management of the corporation for two years. In those two
years, when Gerstner alone has had the responsibility for
the company, Vulcan has changed from a healthy, prosperous growing business (R. p. 310) into an emaciated entity
in deep distress. Capital and surplus have diminished at
an alarming rate. The practical result is that the redemption rights of Markosian, which this Court has already held
were vested in Markosian as of January, 1968, may, if
Judge Hall's order be allowed to stand, totally disappear.
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The interpretation of paragraph 3 ( e) by the trial
court would allow one party to manipulate the price to be
paid the withdrawing shareholder in any fashion he wished.
Such is clearly contrary to the intent of the agreement.
Business men could not reasonably have intended to vest
specific and substantial rights to the return of an investment at one stage, only to give the other party the right
to dissipate and destroy them at some later time.
The inequity of such result is forcibly illustrated if
Markosian were to take the converse situation, i. e. assume
that Markosian waited for a period of two years after termination of his employment before making his demand for
redemption, gauging the time for making such demand to
that moment when he felt that the redemption price would
be at its highest. While there is no specific time limit under
the agreement when demand for redemption must be made
after termination, it is submitted that such a position would
clearly be held to be untenable. What is sauce for the re·
demptioner's goose is equally sauce for the liquidator's
gander.
Moreover, the construction of paragraph 3 ( e) by the
lower court deprives Markosian of one more substantial
right. Under the terms of the agreement, the Corporation
is obligated to redeem stock of one making demand as Markosian did for a given purchase price. The agreement further provides that in the event that the corporation is un·
able to make such redemption payment, then the remaining
shareholders (in this case, Gerstner) "shall be jointly and
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severally obligated to purchase the stock at the determined
price". (Agreement, paragraph 3 ( d) .)
This :right of a personal claim against Gerstner disappears in the event of liquidation and dissolution. The loss
of such right would not be as significant if in fact Gerstner
had demanded litigation and dissolution in a timely way,
because Markosian would have, or should have notice of
the possibility of the exercise of such option, but he would
also have had knowledge of and a measure of responsible
rnntl'Ol over the financial condition of the company. A prudent person would presumably only demand redemption at
a time when even in the alternative event of liquidation and
dissolution he would receive return of his investment.
But to allow the exercise of this option two years later
and, therefore, eliminating Markosian's right to make a
personal claim against Gerstner, after the company's financial condition has totally changed, is to see one more right
previously held by Markosian turn to ashes.
The District Court's interpretation is unreasonable and
defeats the entire purpose of the agreement's redemption
rights.
III. GERSTNER IS BARRED BY HIS OWN
CONDUCT FROM ELECTING A LIQUIDATION
AT THIS TIME.
Two general principles apply to bar Gerstner from asserting now, at this late date, his claim for liquidation.
First Gerstner, along with Vulcan, stands in breach
of the April 21 agreement by reason of his willful refusal

12
to redeem Markosian's stock as promised in the agreement.
By reason of the breach of contract certain rights were
vested in Markosian. Those rights are to recover damages,
or alternatively, to specific performance. Once these con·
tract rights have matured to Markosian's benefit they cannot be defeated by Gerstner's unilateral actions. Markosian's rights, under familiar rules (see Corbin, Contracts
§992) are measured as of the breach, January, 1968, rather
than some other and later date. The effect of the District
Court's most recent order is to measure Markosian's damages as of some future date well over two years after the
cause of action accrued, a result contrary to sound rules
governing contract actions, and one financially disastrous
to Markosian.
The second principle is estoppel. What Gerstner is at·
tempting can be simply stated. After receiving Markosian's
demand for redemption he refused performance and de·
fended this lawsuit on the basis that this agreement did not
mean what it said, even taking an appeal to this Court.
After this Court ruled against him, he took a completely
different tack.
Gerstner's two positions are clearly inconsistent with
each other. Earlier Gerstner had contended that Markosian
had no right to redeem. Now he contends that because of
the assertion of the right to redeem (heretofore denied)
Gerstner may at a time of his own choosing elect to liquidate the corporation.
This is not merely the case of a defendant asserting
inconsistent defenses in his pleadings at the time the issue
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is joined. Here defendant sought to defend initially on an
issue on which he was defeated. At that time he said, "And
if I lose on this issue, then I may decide to do something
(i. e., invoke the liquidation clause) and then raise this as
an issue in the pleadings." The injustice of permitting
Gerstner to do this is obvious. Gerstner elected to follow
a certain course of conduct, and should be bound by his
election. As we have already mentioned above, in the two
years during which Vulcan and Gerstner resisted petitioner's attempts to force redemption, Gerstner had sole control of Vulcan. Vulcan's fate was entirely in the hands of
Gerstner and the consequences would indeed be disastrous
to Markosian if such procedure is condoned.
If Gerstner had early in 1968 elected a liquidation then

petitioner would have had no complaint. By delaying his
election until after the decision of this Court he has seriously prejudiced petitioner's rights. To allow him so to
prejudice those adjudicated rights would be a manifest injustice.
A decision of the Fifth Circuit states the governing
principle. Texas Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 26 F. 2d 394
(5th Cir. 1928), cert. den., 278 U. S. 625. The issue in that
case was the ownership of a petroleum cracking process.
Two persons were responsible for the invention, Gray and
McAfee, both at the time employed by Texas Co. McAfee
then went to work for Gulf. Subsequently both Texas Co.,
on behalf of Gray, and Gulf, on behalf of McAfee, contested
the right to the patent on the process, each contending that
their man made the invention. After a number of years
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in the Patent Office and the courts, it was finally decided
that McAfee (and hence Gulf) was entitled to the patent.
Thereafter, and for the first time, Texas Co. asserted a
right, under the "shop right" doctrine, to the patented
process. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas Co., because
of its years of defense based upon the completely different
theory that Gray was the inventor, was estopped to assert
its "shop right." Texas Co.'s contest of the patent lulled
Gulf "to engage in that contest, and to incur expense of
litigation and of preparation for making use of the pro·
cess." Texas Co.'s conduct "was calculated to lead [Gulf]
to conclude that a result of its succeeding in the litigation
in regard to the patent would be its beneficial ownership
of the patented process ... A party, who in litigation with
his adversary has, with knowledge of the facts, asserted
a particular claim, title, or right, cannot afterward assume
a position inconsistent with such claim, to the prejudice of
the same adversary, who has acted in reliance on such claim
being as it was previously made . . . " 26 F. 2d 397. See
also, City of Boston v. Nielsen, 305 Mass. 429, 26 N. E. 2d
366 (1940); Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 203
F. 2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953); Eads Hide & Wool Co. v. Merrill,
252 F. 2d 80 (10th Cir. 1958); Young v. Bradley, 142 F. 2d
658 (6th Cir. 1944).
This Court has on numerous occasions affirmed this
principle. As it has said in relation to an action on a fraudulent contract of sale, "the sale cannot be valid and void
at the same time". Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69
Utah 161, 253 P. 196 at 199 ( 1927). Or as the Tenth Cir-
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cuit stated in applying Utah law, one cannot seek a remedy
relying upon the repudiation and invalidity of a transaction, and the affirmance and validity of the transaction at
the same time. Estate Counseling Service v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F. 2d 527 (1962). By the
same principles, Markosian cannot be said to both have and
have not a right to redeem at the same time. Gerstner
chose to deny the existence of such right. Based upon this
position, Markosian incurred the considerable expense of
litigation, assuming understandably that if he were successful (which he was) the only issue remaining would be an
accounting as to what was owed him. Once Gerstner has
litigated and been defeated on this issue, he may not now
assert an alleged right dependent upon a right he had previously denied.
Markosian's rights were vested as of the date of
breach. They cannot be divested by later conduct of Gerstner. He is estopped by his conduct since then from taking
this course.
CONCLUSION
There is really no need for copious citation of authority in this brief, because the most convincing and indeed
the controlling authority is the prior decision of this Court
in this very case. There is no basis for a lower court to
impose its interpretation "in lieu" of contractual rights
already granted by this Court.

16
Moreover, the lower court's interpretation is inconsistent with the general intention and purpose of the argument.
Gerstner by his own conduct is precluded from electing a
liquidation at this late date.
Respectfully submitted,

ALBERT J. COLTON
WARREN PATTEN
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX
AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT made and entered into this 12th day
of April, 1965, by and between J. DEAN GERSTNER,
hereinafter referred to as Gerstner, and ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN, hereinafter referred to as Markosian.
RECITALS:
A. Markosian is the sole stockholder in Vulcan Steel
Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called Corporation, which as present is inactive. The only asset of
Corporation is cash in the amount of $1,200.00. Corporation has no liabilities, actual or contingent.
Gerstner has heretofore been engaged in the steel
manufacturing and selling business through a corporation,
Gerstner Steel Supply Company, Inc.
B.

C. Gerstner and Markosian are desirous of engaging
in the business of steel fabricating and related activities,
through Vulcan Steel Corporation.
D. Gerstner and Markosian wish to be assured of a
market at a fair price for their shares of stock in Vulcan
Steel Corporation in the event their interest in Corporation
is terminated for any reason.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
covenants herein contained, the parties hereto agree as
follows:
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1. Subscription for Stock. Markosian shall cause
Corporation to accept a subscription for 805 shares of authorized capital stock of Vulcan Steel Corporation and shall
cause Corporation to issue and deliver 505 shares as follows:
(a) 417 shares will be issued to Gerstner upon
payment in full of $41,700, by the transfer to Corporation, free of all encumbrances, of steel inventories, at
the prices agreed upon by the parties, set forth in
schedule A attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference.
( b) 88 shares shall be issued to Markosian upon
payment by him to Corporation of $8,800 in cash.
(c) Markosian subscribes to an additional 300
shares of stock in Corporation for a total consideration
of $30,000, or a price of $100 per share, to be paid
(i)

$10,000 on or before May 1, 1965, and

(ii)

$20,000 on or before April 1, 1966.

The shares of stock subject to this subscription shall
be issued in proportionate amounts as the subscription
price is paid. At completion of the issuance of stock
provided herein, Gerstner shall own 51 per cent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation and Markosian
shall own 49 per cent.
2. Control. The parties shall vote their stock so as
to provide for the following:
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(a)

The directors shall be Gerstner, Markosian,

and ------------------------------------------------------------------------• to serve
until their successors are duly elected and qualified.
( b)

The officers shall be as follows :
Gerstner
President and Treasurer
Markosian
Vice-President, General
Manager and Secretary

(c) The employment of Markosian as Vice-President, General Manager and Secretary of Corporation
at a monthly salary of $800 per month, payable in
equal semi-monthly installments, plus 5% of the net
profits before taxes as shown on the federal income
tax return, which amount shall be paid on or before
March 15 of each year. Markosian shall devote his
entire time and efforts to the affairs of Corporation.
Within thirty days after closing a written contract of
employment shall be entered into by and between Corporation and Markosian, and such contract shall provide, among other things that may be agreed upon between the parties, a five-year term of employment of
Markosian, with an automatic renewal on the part of
Corporation for continuing one-year periods upon the
same terms and conditions, unless Corporation notifies
Markosian in writing within sixty days of the end of
the term or any extension thereof of its intention to
terminate such agreement, and such contract shall
include provision for a car to be furnished to Markosian and for an expense account covering normal travel
and entertainment expenses incurred on behalf of Corporation.
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3. Restrictions on Sale of Stock. Neither of the par.
ties hereto shall encumber or dispose of this stock except
in accordance with the following terms and conditions:
(a) Transfer to Members of Family. Either
party hereto may transfer all or part of his stock by
gift to or for the benefit of himself or his spouse, or
any lineal ancestor or descendant. In such case, the
transferee shall receive and hold such stock subject to
the terms of this agreement and to the obligations
hereunder of the transferor, and there shall be no
further transfer of such stock except by gift between
members of such family or except in accordance with
the other terms of this agreement. Such transfer shall
be subject to the further requirement that the trans·
feree must agree in writing prior to the transfer that
he will, at the request of the other stockholders, file a
consent by shareholder with the Internal Revenue Service, agreeing to an election by Corporation to be taxed
as a "small business corporation" under the provisions
of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, or such
other provisions of law now or hereafter applicable to
such election. Transfers to members of families can·
not be made in such numbers as would render Corpora·
tion ineligible to be taxed under the Subchapter S provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or like provisions.
This provision does not constitute an agreement by the
parties hereto to elect to be taxed as a "small business
corporation."
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(b) First Option to Purchase Stock. Except as
provided in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph 3, no
stockholder and no transferee who has received stock
in accordance with the provisions of said subparagraph (a) shall encumber or dispose of all or any part
of his or her stock in Corporation, now owned or hereafter acquired by him or her, without the written consent of all other stockholders. In the absence of such
written consent, or at the request of the stockholder
desiring to encumber or dispose of his or her stock,
such stockholder shall give to Corporation and to the
other stockholders written notice of his or her intention, and such notice shall contain an offer to sell all
of his or her stock in accordance with the terms of this
agreement. The Corporation shall have thirty days
from the date of the receipt of such notice with which
to purchase the stockholder's stock. The purchase price
of the stock offered for sale shall be in accordance with
the provisions of subparagraph ( c) of paragraph 3.
In the event Corporation shall fail or refuse to purchase such stock within the time herein provided, then
the party desiring to sell or dispose of said stock shall
be free to make any other disposition of it afforded or
desired.
( c) Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock
Offered. At the termination of employment by Corporation of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, it
shall be mandatory for Corporation to purchase all of
the stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any stockholder
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chased in quantities normally purchased by
the Corporation.)
(B) Net book value of property plant
and equipment shall be adjusted by adding
back the excess of accelerated depreciation
over straight-line depreciation taken by Corporation.
(C) Any other items wherein the accounting treatment of transactions by Corporation differs from generally accepted accounting principles as determined by an independent certified public accountant.
The purchase price determined herein shall be
paid in three equal installments, unless the selling
stockholder notifies the corporation in writing of his
desire to receive 29 per cent of the purchase price as
the initial payment, with the first installment payable
within 15 days after the determination of the price and
the other two installments to be made yearly on the
same date in each succeeding year with interest at the
rate of 5 percent on the unpaid balance. Said purchase
price shall be determined not more than 45 days after
the written offer to Corporation by the selling stockholder.
( d) If at the time Corporation is required to
make payment of the purchase price its surplus is insufficient for such purpose, then (1) stock to the ex-
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or transferee giving written notice as herein provided
of his or her intention to dispose of his or her stock.
The purchase price of the stock offered for sale shall
be its fair market value at the date of the offer to sell,
determined as follows :
(i) The parties shall determine the value of
the assets annually and such resultant sum shall
be the total sales value of the shares of stock of
said corporation. In the event the parties fail to
establish the value of the assets on or before January 15 of each year, then the value of the assets
for that year shall be determined under subdivisions (ii), (iii), and (iv) hereof.
The assets shall be valued at the book
value to be fixed by an immediate inventory
thereof.
(ii)

(iii) The good will of said corporation shall
be estimated by taking the yearly average profits
during the previous five years and multiplying the
same by 21/2.

(iv) The amount determined by adding the
amounts of items (ii) and (iii) shall be adjusted
by:
(A) Inventories shall be increased to
fair market value. (Fair market value shall
be defined for this purpose as replacement
value at that date for such items when pur·
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tent of the entire available surplus shall be purchased,
and (2) Corporation and the stockholder shall prompt.
ly take all required action to reduce the capital stock
of Corporation to the extent necessary for the redemption of the unpurchased stock at the fair market value
price determined as provided herein. If Corporation
does not or is unable to reduce its capital stock, or by
any statutory provision or rule of law is prevented
from making the purchase of the stock offered for sale,
then the remaining stockholders shall be jointly and
severally obligated to purchase the stock at the determined price. Each of said remaining stockholders
shall be entitled to purchase a proportionate share of
the stock offered for sale. The term "proportionate
share" shall mean that portion of the stock of Corporation offered for sale which the stock of Corporation
owned by each of the stockholders bears to the stock
of Corporation (other than offered for sale) owned by
all stockholders. In addition, if any stock of Corporation offered for sale is not purchased by the stockholder first entitled thereto, the term "proportionate
share" shall include that portion of the stock of Corporation not purchased by the stockholder first entitled
thereto, which the stock of Corporation owned by the
stockholder bears to the stock of Corporation (other
than offered for sale) owned by all stockholders other
than the stockholder first entitled to purchase.
( e) Dual Notice. In the event both Markosian
and Gerstner wish to terminate their employment by
Corporation, and desire to have Corporation purchase
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their stock, the parties hereto agree to vote their stock
for the liquidation and dissolution of Corporation.

Purchase and Sale of Stock upon Death of a
Stockholder. Upon the death of any of the stockholders, all of the stock owned by him in Corporation at
the time of his death and any stock owned by any
transferee who shall receive stock from him in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph 3 shall be offered or deemed to have been
offered for redemption or sale by the legal representative of his estate and by any such transferee, within
ten days after qualification of such legal representative. Such stock shall be redeemed or purchased in the
manner provided by subparagraph (c) of this paragraph 3 at a price determined as provided therein, except that the purchase price shall be paid in cash to the
legal representative of his estate and for any such
transferee. The parties hereto agree to vote their
shares to have Corporation purchase a life insurance
policy on each of their lives in an amount not less than
------------------------ per cent of the net book value of the
total outstanding stock of Corporation at the end of
each calendar or fiscal year, with the premium to be
paid by Corporation, and Corporation to be named as
beneficiary, and the proceeds of such policies to be
applied against the purchase price or redemption of
stock of the stockholder or his transferee. Said amounts
of insurance shall be increased each year to the minimum amount provided herein, within 60 days after the
(f)
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end of the calendar or fiscal year to the extent that the
parties hereto are insurable.

Termination of Restrictions on Dispos'ition of
Stock. Provisions restricting the sale of stock contained in
this agreement shall terminate upon the happening of any
of the following events :
4.

(a) The adjudication of Corporation as a bankrupt, the execution by it of any assignment for the
benefit of creditors or the appointment of a receiver
for Corporation.
(b) The involuntary or voluntary dissolution of
Corporation.
5. Endorsement of Stock Certificates. The certificates of stock of Corporation to be issued pursuant to the
agreement shall bear the following endorsement:
"The shares of stock represented by this certificate are subject to all the terms of an agreement made
April ____ , 1965, between J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian, a copy of which is on file at the office of
the corporation."
6.

Closing. The date of closing shall be ______________________,

1965, at which time the shares of capital stock of Corpora·
tion, subscribed for by the parties hereto, will be issued
and delivered and the subscription price paid by each. The
time of closing shall be ____________________________ , and the place of
closing shall be the offices of Fabian & Clendenin, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. Each of the
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parties shall do all further acts and execute all documents
that may be necessary to the carrying out of this agreement.
7. Ratification of Agreement. The parties shall vote
their stock so as to cause Corporation to adopt and ratify
all the terms of this agreement by resolution. A certified
copy of this resolution shall be delivered to each of the
parties hereto.
8. Notices. Any notices to be given under the terms
of this agreement shall be in writing and addressed to Corporation at its principal place of business, and any notices
to be given to either of the individual parties to this agreement shall be addressed to them at their residences, or at
such other address as any of such parties may hereafter
designate in writing to the others. Any such notice shall
be deemed fully given when enclosed in a properly sealed
envelope or wrapper addressed as herein required, certified
and deposited (postage and certification fee prepaid) in a
post office or branch post office regularly maintained by
the United States government in the continental United
States.
9. Benefit. This agreement shall survive the closing
and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Corporation and the parties hereto, their respective successors
and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed
this agreement.
/s/ J. DEAN GERSTNER
/s/ ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN

